

THE STUDY OF MIND AND ITS FUNCTIONS

NON-VALID AWARENESSES

The definition of a **non-valid consciousness** is: **a knower that is not newly incontrovertible.**

The definition of a **subsequent cognizer** is: **a knower which realizes what has already been realized.**

When subsequent cognizer is divided, there are three:

- **directly perceiving subsequent cognizer (5)**
 - directly perceiving subsequent cognizer that is a sense direct perceiver
e.g. second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue
 - directly perceiving subsequent cognizer that is a mental direct perceiver
e.g. the second moment of a clairvoyance knowing another's mind
 - directly perceiving subsequent cognizer that is a self-knowing direct perceiver
e.g. the second moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing an eye consciousness
 - directly perceiving subsequent cognizer that is a yogic direct perceiver
e.g. the second moment of an uninterrupted path of a path of seeing
 - directly perceiving subsequent cognizer that is none of those four.
e.g. the second moment of a direct perceiver
- **conceptual subsequent cognizer (2)**
 - conceptual subsequent cognizer that is induced by a direct perceiver
e.g. a factually concordant ascertaining consciousness ascertaining blue that is induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue.
 - those that are induced by inferential cognizers.
e.g. the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent
- **subsequent cognizer that is neither of those two.**

The definition of a **correctly assuming consciousness** is: **a factually concordant determinative knower which is controvertible with regard to determining its object.**

When correctly assuming consciousnesses are divided there are five:

- **correctly assuming consciousnesses which do not have a reason**

e.g. an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent in dependence upon the mere words, "Sound is impermanent." [This is a suitable example] because the words, "Sound is impermanent," express a thesis that sound is impermanent, but not a reason.

- **correctly assuming consciousnesses which have a contradictory reason**

e.g. an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being empty of being able to perform a function. [This is a suitable example] because empty of being able to perform a function is contradictory with impermanence.

- **correctly assuming consciousnesses for which the reason is indefinite [or lacks pervasion]**

e.g. an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being an object of comprehension. [This is a suitable example] because object of comprehension is a reason which is indefinite in the proof of that [i.e., whatever is an object of comprehension is not necessarily impermanent].

- **correctly assuming consciousnesses for which the reason is not established**

e.g. an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being an object of apprehension by an eye consciousness. [This is a suitable example] because object of apprehension by an eye consciousness is a reason which is not established in the proof of that.

- **correctly assuming consciousnesses for which a reason exists but is not settled**

e.g. an awareness which apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being a product, without its having been ascertained by valid cognition that sound is a product and whatever is a product must be impermanent. [This is a suitable example] because although product is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent, that person has not settled it.

Correctly assuming consciousnesses lack stability unlike inferential cognizers. Being consciousnesses which are merely assertions, merely beliefs, they can easily change to doubt. For example, a teacher might tell you, "It is good to engage in religious practice; it will be of great benefit to you in the future," and you might accept this, generating the thought, "Religious practice is good". However this is merely an assertion; you have not realized it incontrovertibly in dependence on a correct sign; for this reason it can easily turn to doubt, as for instance if some other person says that it is not good to engage in religious practice, for such activities will only bring hardship in this life, whereas from working at a good job one can gain wealth, property and possessions. Hearing such words

your belief in the efficacy of religious practice might turn to doubt, for you can see directly the immediate effects of a good job – the ability to buy a big house, eat good food and so forth – whereas the effects of religious practice are not accessible to immediate direct perception but appear only in the future. Thus, correctly assuming consciousness lack the stability of inferential cognition, from which one cannot be swayed no matter what anyone might say.

The definition of something's being **an awareness to which an object appears without being ascertained** is: **a knower that is a common locus of (1) having clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object of engagement and (2) being unable to induce ascertainment with respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object of operation.**

However, one should know the manner in which not to posit as the definition of “something's being an awareness to which the object appears without being ascertained,” “that which is a common locus of (1) having clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object and (2) being unable to induce ascertainment with respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object.”

This is because a sense consciousness that sees snow mountains as blue sees as blue the white color of the snow mountains, which is its object of operation, and therefore does not see clearly the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object of operation. Still, since its appearing object, the white color of snow mountains, appears clearly as blue whereas it does not exist [as blue], there is clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object. Also it is unable to induce ascertainment with respect to that because it engages that [object] perversely.

Illustrations of awarenesses to which an object appears without being ascertained are, for example

- a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue which induces the doubt that wonders, “Did I see blue or not?”;
- mental direct perceivers in the continuums of ordinary beings apprehending the five objects -- forms, and so forth;
- self-knowers experiencing those [mental direct perceivers].

The definition of a **doubting consciousness** is: **a knower which has qualms two-pointedly by its own power.**

A mind which possesses similarity with doubt and the feelings, etc., which are companions of that [mind possessing similarity with doubt] have qualms by the power of doubt, but do not have qualms two pointedly by their own power.

When doubting consciousnesses are divided there are three:

- **doubt tending toward the factual**

e.g. doubt which thinks that sound is probably impermanent

- **doubt tending toward the non-factual**

e.g. doubt which thinks that sound is probably permanent

- **equal doubt.**

e.g. doubt which wonders whether sound is permanent or impermanent.

The definition of a **wrong consciousness** is: **a knower which engages its object erroneously.**

When wrong consciousnesses are divided, there are two:

- **Conceptual**

e.g. a thought apprehending sound as permanent and a thought apprehending the horns of a rabbit.

- **non-conceptual ones.**

- mental

e.g. a dream consciousness which clearly sees as blue the blue of a dream. This subject is a mental consciousness, a non conceptual consciousness, and a wrong consciousness. Respectively, [it is a mental consciousness] because of being a dream consciousness, [a non-conceptual consciousness] because of being a consciousness which is free from being a determinative knower which apprehends a sound generality and a meaning generality as suitable to be mixed, and [a wrong consciousness] because of being a consciousness which apprehends its object, a form which is a phenomenon-source, as blue, whereas it does not exist as blue. However, we say that for the person who is dreaming that [dream consciousness which clearly sees the blue of a dream as blue] is a factually concordant sense consciousness.

- sense consciousnesses.

e.g. a sense consciousness which sees snow mountains as blue and a sense consciousness which sees a white conch as yellow.